As Volodymyr Zelensky sits across from Donald Trump at Mar-a-Lago, two very different wars are unfolding at once.
On the ground, Russian forces are still pushing hard in eastern and southern Ukraine, claiming new gains around Myrnohrad, Pokrovsk and Huliaipole – claims Kyiv disputes as heavy fighting continues. In the air, missiles and drones continue to hit Ukrainian cities and energy infrastructure.
In Florida, however, the language is all about momentum and optimism. Trump tells cameras there are the “makings of a deal”; Zelensky says a US-brokered 20-point peace plan is “around 90%” agreed.
For Europe, this apparent sprint towards a settlement is both deeply consequential and deeply unsettling. A war that has re-shaped the continent’s security order is being haggled over at a private US resort – after a 75-minute Trump–Putin call in which both men agreed they do not support the temporary ceasefire ideas floated by Kyiv and European capitals.
Behind the upbeat soundbites, the fault lines are stark.
Putin’s “bold decision” and the price of Donbas
The Kremlin’s public read-out of the Trump–Putin call is brutally clear about what Moscow wants.
Putin’s aide Yuri Ushakov says the war can end only when Kyiv takes a “brave, responsible political decision” on Donbas – code for withdrawing from the remaining parts of the region it still controls. Russia already occupies about a fifth of Ukraine, and claims around 90% of the Donetsk region; it now wants Ukraine to abandon the rest.
Crucially, Moscow and Washington are – at least according to the Kremlin – aligned on one key point: both Trump and Putin reject a temporary ceasefire linked to preparations for a referendum on territory, arguing it would “only prolong the conflict” and risk renewed fighting.
That matters because any legitimate referendum on the future of occupied territory is impossible while artillery is still firing. Ukrainian officials have repeatedly said that decisions on territory must go through democratic procedures – but that requires a real ceasefire first.
Former Ukrainian deputy defence minister Volodymyr Harylov bluntly summed up Kyiv’s view: Russia “is not ready for a ceasefire” and treats any compromise as a personal defeat for Putin. The idea of Ukrainians calmly voting on their future under these conditions is, for now, a political fantasy.
Ukrainians don’t believe in a quick peace – or in surrender
Inside Ukraine, the Mar-a-Lago spectacle is being watched with a mix of anxiety and scepticism.
Recent polling by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, reported internationally by Reuters, shows:
- Only single-digit percentages of Ukrainians believe the war will end by early 2026
- Around two-thirds say they are prepared to continue fighting rather than accept major concessions
- Roughly three-quarters reject peace plans that mirror Russia’s demands – withdrawal from Donbas, reduction of the army, and no clear security guarantees
This is not a war that Ukrainians feel they can simply trade away.
Ukraine’s military intelligence chief, Kyrylo Budanov, warns that Russia has already recruited more than 400,000 contract soldiers in 2025 and plans to mobilise even more in 2026, with a clear objective: full control of Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions and further advances into central Ukraine.
In other words: while Trump talks about being “close” to peace, Moscow is still gearing up for a long and costly war – and Ukrainians know it.
The 20-point plan: three explosive issues
Reports in European and US media suggest the draft 20-point peace framework circling between Kyiv, Washington and European capitals revolves around three clusters of issues: territory, security guarantees and economics.
1. Territory: how much of Ukraine is negotiable?
Zelensky is said to be willing to consider a demilitarised buffer zone in parts of Donbas – pulling Ukrainian troops back up to 40km if Russian forces do the same, with the future status of the area later subject to some form of internationally supervised process.
Russia, however, insists that Ukraine must formally hand over all remaining areas of Donetsk it still controls. It has shown no indication it would voluntarily pull back forces that took years and enormous casualties to advance.
In Ukrainian politics, any map that looks like “land for peace” is toxic. For European democracies, endorsing forced border changes under fire is equally dangerous: it would set a precedent that a nuclear-armed aggressor can redraw borders by force, then have its gains legitimised in Florida.
2. Security guarantees: NATO-lite, or something weaker?
Ukraine wants what Zelensky has called NATO-style guarantees – a legal commitment that Western powers will come to its defence if Russia attacks again, analogous to NATO’s Article 5.
In practice, that vision has morphed into talk of a “coalition of the willing”: European-led multinational forces that could deploy to Ukraine in the event of a ceasefire to monitor and deter renewed aggression.
Moscow’s response has been predictably blunt. Foreign minister Sergei Lavrov has declared that any European contingents on Ukrainian soil would be “legitimate targets” for Russian forces, and accused Europe of “preparing for war” with Russia.
For European leaders, that raises a brutal question: can they credibly offer Ukraine a security umbrella that stops short of full NATO membership but is still strong enough to deter a Russia willing to accept immense losses?
3. Economics and nuclear power: who controls Zaporizhzhia?
Trump has repeatedly hinted that ending the war would unlock huge economic opportunities for reconstruction and energy projects, with US and European companies deeply involved.
At the heart of this is the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant – Europe’s largest nuclear facility, currently under Russian control since 2022. Before the invasion, it supplied around a fifth of Ukraine’s electricity.
One version of the peace blueprint reportedly envisages joint Ukrainian–US (or international) management of Zaporizhzhia under some kind of special regime.
Critics warn this is far from straightforward:
- The plant sits in Russian-occupied territory; any “joint” control risks de facto recognition of that occupation.
- The International Atomic Energy Agency has already had to broker narrow local ceasefires simply to repair power lines and reduce the risk of a nuclear accident.
- Splitting legal ownership, operational control and security responsibilities between Russia, Ukraine and foreign partners could create a permanent safety and governance nightmare.
European publics, already wary of nuclear risk, may not welcome a grand bargain that leaves their largest nuclear plant inside an effectively Russian-controlled grey zone.
Europe’s awkward seat at someone else’s table
European governments are formally “in the loop”. After his arrival in Florida, Zelensky held a call with UK prime minister Keir Starmer, who reaffirmed Britain’s commitment to a “just and lasting peace” and condemned recent Russian drone strikes on Kyiv. Both leaders “commended” Trump’s engagement.
Yet the real choreography is clear:
- Trump speaks at length with Putin.
- Trump then meets Zelensky at his private club.
- Only after that are European leaders dialled in collectively.
From a European perspective, there are at least three concerns:
- Being presented with a fait accompli – a plan drawn up in Washington and Moscow, with EU states reduced to funding and “guaranteeing” an agreement they had little hand in shaping.
- US disengagement risk – if Trump frames success as simply “ending the war quickly”, there is a danger of a deal that locks in Russian gains and leaves Europe to underwrite security and reconstruction for decades.
- Internal EU fractures – not all member states are equally enthusiastic about long-term commitments to Ukraine’s defence, particularly if that means permanent deployments near the front line under Lavrov’s shadow of “legitimate targets”.
Starmer’s language about a “just” peace, not merely any peace, reflects a broader European fear: that a rushed settlement could stabilise the battlefield at the cost of shredding core principles the EU claims to stand for – sovereignty, the rule of law, and the inadmissibility of territorial conquest.
The politics of “90% done”
Trump’s insistence that peace is “not that complicated” and “90%” of the deal is complete plays well in soundbites.
But three hard realities undercut that narrative:
- The front lines are still moving.
Even as the Mar-a-Lago motorcade rolled, Russian generals were boasting of fresh gains, and Ukraine was denying them while admitting to heavy fighting. Both sides are still trying to improve their bargaining position on the ground. - Russia is planning for years, not months.
Budanov’s intelligence brief is blunt: Moscow is recruiting hundreds of thousands of contract soldiers and budgeting nearly half of federal spending on defence and security, with clear plans for further offensives in 2026. - Ukrainian society is nowhere near ready to sign off on big concessions.
Polls show very limited public support for giving up territory or accepting a peace that leaves Russia’s political objectives intact. For any deal involving territorial change, Zelensky has pledged to hold a referendum – but that requires a ceasefire Russia currently rejects, and a legal framework Ukrainians trust.
In that light, talk of being “90% there” sounds less like a measured assessment and more like political pressure. The risk is that “getting to yes” in Florida becomes more important to Washington and Moscow than building a settlement sustainable for Kyiv – and for Europe.
What would a European definition of a just peace look like?
From a European vantage point, a durable and legitimate peace in Ukraine would need to satisfy at least four tests:
- Ukrainian consent, not coercion
Any settlement involving borders or sovereignty must be accepted by Ukrainian society through free political processes, not imposed under bombardment or under threat of Western aid cuts. - Real, not cosmetic, security guarantees
Whether through NATO, a coalition of the willing, or EU-led arrangements, guarantees must be credible enough to deter renewed Russian aggression – which means clear red lines and pre-committed support, not vague assurances. - No reward for naked aggression
Europe has already lived through the consequences of appeasing territorial revisionism once in the 20th century. Freezing the war with Russia in control of large illegally seized regions, absent any genuine accountability, would invite future adventurism – not only from Moscow. - A governance solution for Zaporizhzhia that prioritises safety
Any regime for Europe’s largest nuclear plant must be grounded in robust international oversight and clear chains of responsibility. Half-measures that leave de facto control with an occupying power while spreading legal responsibility across multiple states are a recipe for long-term risk.
None of these conditions guarantee a quick deal. All of them suggest that if there is a “sprint” in Florida, Europe may have to be the one applying the brakes.
Peace with Europe, not just near Europe
Trump is right about one thing: this war will end either at a negotiating table or with even more horrific bloodshed. Millions of lives do hinge on the choices made in the coming months.
But how it ends – and on whose terms – will shape Europe’s security order for a generation. A settlement that trades Ukrainian territory for a photo-op and a lull in fighting may end one phase of the war while planting the seeds of the next.
For Europe, the message from Mar-a-Lago is clear: it cannot afford to be a bystander in a process that will decide the future of its largest neighbour, its own security and the credibility of the post-Cold War order. Any peace that lasts will have to be built with Europe, with Ukraine – not simply announced to them from a gilded dining room in Florida.
